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IS THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE
EXCESSIVELY KIND TO
MONEY LAUNDERERS, DRUG DEALERS,
AND TAX EVADERS?
ANN JENNINGS MARON*
INTRODUCTION

If I were in the drug business, I'd be popping the champagne
corks right now.'
The weight of currency generated from heroin sales has been
estimated to be ten times the weight of the drug that has been
sold.! For every ton of heroin sold, drug traffickers must contend
with ten tons of illicit currency
A conservative estimate reports that over fifty billion dollars
is realized annually from the sale of illegal drugs in the United
States.4 This volume of money amounts to over thirteen million
pounds of illicit currency.5 Imagine the dilemma the drug dealer
faces when pondering how to launder this massive volume of
currency into the legitimate system without drawing law
enforcement's attention. Imagine that a huge roadblock has been
removed from a money launderer's path. In 1998, the United
States Supreme Court held in United States v. Bajakajian that
merely "moving" money illegally, in the absence of evidence that a
defendant has committed another offense or that the source of the
funds is some type of illegal activity, is not a sufficient basis to
forfeit the entirety of the currency. According to the implications
of Bajakajian,the forfeiture may be limited to only five percent of
* J.D. Candidate, Jan. 2001. The Author wishes to acknowledge and
express her appreciation to Marsha McClellan, Ned Milenkovich, Thomas
Moriarty, Michael Priess, and Lynette Redmer for their editing assistance.

Special thanks to Christopher Carlson for his invaluable contributions to this
Comment.
1. Jerry Zremski, Justices Limit Forfeiture Losses, BUFF. NEws, June 23,
1998, at 1B (quoting Stefan Cassella, Assistant Chief of the Department of
Justice's Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section).
2. IRS, NarcoticsProgram (visited Nov. 25, 1998) <http:
//www.hq.irs.gov/CI/CI/media/ narcotics.htm>.

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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the money attempted to be "moved."6
With its decision in Bajakajian, the United States Supreme
Court struck down a fine as excessive under the Eighth
Amendment for the first time in over two hundred years.7 In a five
to four decision, the Court ruled that a punitive forfeiture cannot
be grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense.8 The Court
also re-affirmed its decision in United States v. Austin that the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to both
criminal forfeitures and civil forfeitures that are punitive in

nature.!
On June 9, 1994, United States Customs officials arrested
Hosep Krikor Bajakajian for violating currency-reporting
requirements. He and his family had lied repeatedly about the
amount of currency they were carrying while attempting to board
an international flight at Los Angeles International Airport with
$357,144 in currency hidden in their baggage, wallets and a
purse.' ° Title 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) requires the declaration of
any currency in excess of $10,000 that is being transported out of
the United States."
The government subsequently indicted
Bajakajian for willfully failing to report the currency" and for
making false statements to customs officials." The government
moved for forfeiture of the entire $357,144 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
982, which permits forfeiture of "any property, real or personal,"
involved in a violation of § 5316 "or any property traceable to such

6. United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2045-46 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). There is also a remote possibility that none of the money may
have to be forfeited. Id. at 2038 n.11. The majority was careful to note that
the only issue that it was addressing was whether full forfeiture of the entire
amount was constitutional. Id. It did not address the appropriateness of the
district court's decision to impose a $15,000 fine on Mr. Bajakajian. Id.
7. Stuart Taylor, Of Forfeitures and Freedom; An Atypical High Court
Coalition Invokes the Eighth Amendment's Ban on Excessive Fines to Strike
Down a Criminal Forfeiture,TEX. LAW., July 6, 1998, at 23. See Bajakajian,

118 S. Ct. at 2033 (stating that the "Court has had little occasion to interpret,
and has never actually applied the Excessive Fines Clause"). See also
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259 (1989)
(holding that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to punitive damages).
8. Bajakajian,118 S.Ct. at 2036.
9. Id. at 2033.
10. Id. at 2032. Bajakajian and his wife had declared that they were
carrying $8,000 and $7,000, respectively. Id. A total of $357,144 was
discovered after their belongings were searched. Id.
11. 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) (1994).
12. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2032. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (1994)
(providing that the penalty for willfully failing to report currency may result
in one or both of the following: a fine of up to $250,000 or a prison sentence of
up to five years).
13. Bajakajian, 118 S.Ct. at 2032. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) (providing
that the penalty for making a fraudulent or false statement to a customs
official will result in a fine, or imprisonment of up to five years, or both).
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property," as part of the offender's sentence. 4
In its holding, the Court affirmed a decision by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals that the forfeiture of all the currency
would be unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. 5 After determining that the forfeiture would
be punitive rather than remedial because the currency was not
shown to be an instrumentality of the offense, the Court held that
the test for excessiveness
"involves solely a proportionality
6
determination."1
The decision in Bajakajianhas substantially weakened one of
the government's strongest weapons and has resulted in a victory
for "drug dealers, money launderers and tax evaders." 7 Without
proof of an underlying violation in addition to the currency
reporting violation, the government cannot force the violator to
forfeit the full amount of the currency that has been seized."
Therefore, individuals involved in illegal activities will pay a much
smaller price for their attempts to "move" currency into or out of
the country if caught, absent proof of an additional violation.
United States Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy dissented
in Bajakajian and stated that "[t]he decision is disturbing both for
its specific holding and for the broader upheaval it foreshadows." 9
Kennedy predicted that the "decision portends serious disruption
of a vast range of statutory fines." 0
Although the Court previously held that the Excessive Fines
Clause applied to punitive forfeitures, it never established a
standard for excessiveness. 2' In Bajakajian, the Court defined the
14. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2032 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (1994)).
This statute also authorizes the forfeiture of property that is derived from, or
traceable to, proceeds for other offenses such as money laundering,
structuring, wire fraud and mail fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 982 (a)(2).
15. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2041.

16. Id. at 2036.
17. Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Cert., United States v. Bajakajian, 84
F.3d 334 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1487). In its petition, the government noted
that the forfeiture provision that allows full forfeiture of currency seized for
reporting violations is a powerful tool for combating illegal activity. Id.
Without it, the government warned, the Ninth Circuit "could readily become a
haven for drug dealers, money launderers, and tax evaders intent on

conducting non-traceable currency transactions." Id.
18. Bajakajian,118 S.Ct. at 2038-39.

19. Id. at 2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
20. Id. See also Tony Mauro, Court Strikes Down Government Penalty,
USA TODAY, July 23, 1998, at 3A (stating that the decision was called a "huge

disappointment" by a Department of Justice official). Stefan Cassella,
Assistant Chief of the Department of Justice's Asset Forfeiture and Money
Laundering Section, said the Court "eviscerate[d] one of law enforcement's
most effective tools." Id.
21. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993). The Court stated
that prudence dictates that the lower courts determine the test for
excessiveness.

Id. See Laila Abou-Rahme et al., ProceduralIssues, 35 AM.
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standard as "grossly -disproportional,"2 but it left other issues
unresolved.
The majority opinion provides little guidance
regarding what constitutes a proportional forfeiture. Additionally,
because the opinion is contradictory, it remains unclear what
impact, if any, Bajakajian will have on traditional in rem civil
forfeitures. 2 Most likely, the decision will render "a wide range of
forfeitures subject to challenge on excessiveness grounds" and "will
clearly make it easier to succeed on an excessiveness claim than it
was before in some circuits."'
This Comment explores the impact United States v.
Bajakajian is likely to have on future criminal and civil
forfeitures. Part I provides an overview of the history of forfeiture,
the types of forfeiture proceedings, and the Court's application of
the Excessive Fines Clause to criminal and civil forfeitures. Part
II analyzes the history and purpose of the Eighth Amendment and
attempts to determine what constitutes a proportional fine. Part
III proposes that the circuits adopt a hybrid test to determine
whether a fine is proportional, and suggests that the contradictory
language in Bajakajian has not compromised the decision in
Austin. Part IV concludes that the government can best overcome
excessiveness challenges by including proof of additional violations
whenever possible.

I. BACKGROUND
Section A examines the origins and development of forfeiture
law.
Next, Section B explains the two types of forfeiture
proceedings. Finally, Section C discusses the Eighth Amendment
and the protections it offers under the Excessive Fines Clause.
A. From Deodandsand Forfeitureof the Estate to Civil and
CriminalForfeituresof the Modern Age
Civil forfeiture has an extensive history."

It began in

CRIM. L. REV. 1061, 1089 (1998) (stating that the Austin Court declined to

establish a test for excessiveness, which resulted in a split among the circuits).
22. 118 S.Ct. at 2036.
23. Id. at 2034-35 nn.4 & 6.
24. David B. Smith, Forfeiture:Supreme Court Adopts ReasonablenessTest

for Excessive Fines, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 1998, at 49. However, it is unlikely
that Bajakajian poses any threat to the constitutionality of prior forfeitures.
United States v. $267,522, No. 90-5773, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13233, at *15-16

(E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1998). The District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania noted there was nothing in the Bajakajian decision to indicate
that the holding applied to forfeiture judgments that had already been
entered. Id. at 16.
25. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83
(1974). Providing an overview of the origin and history of forfeiture, the Court
noted that a reference to early forfeiture can be found in the Bible. Id. at 681.
"[I1f an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be stoned: and his
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England during the reign of Edward I in the late thirteenth
century."
The Crown required felons to forfeit their entire
estate,27 and any instrumentality that caused the death of one of
the King's subjects was forfeited to the Crown as a deodand.'
Ships and their goods were also seized when entering Great
Britain's waters if the ships were not carrying British goods or if
they had not originated in a port that the King had first
approved.' Forfeitures were a source of substantial revenue for
the Crown, and English forfeiture law was subsequently exported
to the American colonies.' Although the United States does not
permit forfeiture of an estate and has rejected the law of the
deodand,3 1 other forms of forfeitures have continued under the
authority of maritime and customs statutes.32
The United States government currently uses forfeiture
statutes to combat a multitude of crimes, 3 and asset forfeiture is

flesh shall not be eaten." Id. at n.17 (quoting Exodus 21:28).
26. CriminalAsset Forfeiture:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Crime of the
House Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1997), available in LEXIS, News
Library, ARCHIVES File [hereinafter Hearing on Criminal Asset Forfeiture]
(testimony of E.E. Edwards, National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers).
27. Id.; Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682. See generally STEVEN L. KESSLER,
CML AND CRIMINAL FORFEITURE § 1.02 (7th ed. 1998) (providing a historical

overview of forfeiture).
28. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81.
Either the item itself or its
equivalent value was forfeited to the King. Id.; Hearing on Criminal Asset
Forfeiture, supra note 26 (testimony of E.E. Edwards, National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers). See generally KESSLER, supra note 27, at § 1.02
(providing a historical overview of forfeiture).
29. See generally Hearing on Criminal Asset Forfeiture, supra note 26
(providing the testimony of E.E. Edwards, National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers). See generally KESSLER, supra note 27, at § 1.02 (providing
a historical overview of forfeiture).
30. See Hearingon CriminalAsset Forfeiture,supra note 26 (discussing the
history of forfeiture). Eighty percent of the nation's revenues were raised from
customs duties during the first hundred years of this country's existence. Id.
31. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682-83; see generally Hearing on Criminal
Asset Forfeiture,supra note 26 (discussing the history of forfeiture). See also 1
EDWARD HYDE EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 386-87 (P.R. Glazebrook, ed.,
Professional Books Limited 1972) (1803) (discussing original application of
deodands). Deodands are objects that were subject to forfeiture because they
caused the death of a person. Id. at 386. If a man died while watering his
horse, and the horse caused his death, the horse would be forfeited to the
crown. Id. However, if the horse did not cause the man's death, it would not
be considered a deodand. Id.
32. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). English law has
authorized forfeitures for tax and customs violations for approximately two
hundred years, and similar laws have been in place in the United States since
its formation. Id. See generally KESSLER, supra note 27, at § 1.02 (providing a
historical overview of forfeiture).
33. See infra notes 40-46 (describing crimes for which forfeiture statutes

have been enacted).
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Federal forfeiture

statutes85 are effectively used by the Department of Justice 1 and
the Department of Treasury37 to strike at the heart of criminal
34. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 216 (1996)

[hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 1916] (statement of Stefan Cassella, Deputy
Chief of Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice).
35. See generally JIMMY GuRUL9 & SANDRA GUERRA, THE LAW OF ASSET
FORFEITURE 401-30 (1998) [hereinafter GURUL91 (listing selected criminal and
civil forfeiture statutes). Selected criminal forfeiture statutes include 18
U.S.C. § 982 (1994) (authorizing forfeiture of property involved in, or traceable

to, a money laundering violation); 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994) (RICO) (ordering
forfeiture of a defendant's interest in a racketeering enterprise and any
property derived therefrom); and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1994) (directing forfeiture of
property and proceeds derived from or facilitating narcotics violations). Id. at
401-15. Selected civil forfeiture statutes include 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1994)
(ordering forfeiture of any property involved in a money laundering violation
or an attempted money laundering transaction); 18 U.S.C. § 984 (1994)
(permitting forfeiture of goods not specifically identified as being involved in
the offense); 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (1994) (allowing forfeiture of property illegally
imported into, or exported from, the United States in violation of Customs
laws); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994) (ordering forfeiture of property used to
manufacture, contain or convey controlled substances); and 31 U.S.C. § 5317
(1994) (permitting forfeiture of monetary instruments and property traceable
to violations of Customs reporting requirements). Id. at 415-430.
36. Hearing on H.R. 1916, supra note 34, at 216-17 (statement of Stefan

Cassella, Deputy Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice). Mr. Cassella stated that in rem
forfeiture statutes are very beneficial to the government because they enable
the forfeiture of assets that cannot be reached criminally. Id.
37. Id. at 240 (statement of Jan P. Blanton, Director, Treasury Executive
Office for Asset Forfeiture). Ms. Blanton stated:
[bly relentlessly focusing on the profitability of crime, it is an
enforcement tool that keeps pace with evermore well-financed and
international criminal groups. It is an enforcement tool with notable
interrelated benefits. It pays for its own property management costs

and relieves additional burdens that otherwise would fall to our law
abiding citizens and taxpayers. It strengthens law enforcement by
rechanneling forfeited value back into this most fundamental societal
purpose. It promotes cooperation among federal, state and local police
around the country through our ability to equitably share forfeited
assets with those who have assisted in our investigations. It allows for
victim restitution by permitting us to return the forfeited assets of
criminals to those who were once their prey. Under the Weed and Seed
program, it turns tainted properties back to constructive community
use. It even sanctions the donation of forfeited assets to charitable
organizations and the transfer of forfeited monies to support our
national effort to reduce the demand for illegal drugs.
Id. See generally Susan Jacobson, Kissimee Man Pleads Guilty in Fraud;Ben
0. CarrollAgreed to Forfeit $32 Million for Selling Adult Diapers as Medical
Devices and Billing Medicare, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 12, 1996, at 1 (stating

that an individual who defrauded Medicare out of $70 million by selling adult
diapers as medical devices will forfeit $32 million in cash and securities); Eric
Miller, Drug Dealing Fuels Tucson 'Success Story;' Dad, Son Used Top Radio
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activity by separating criminals from their profit and the
instrumentalities that they use to commit their offenses.'
The
impact of forfeiture is far-reaching, and the government uses civil
and criminal forfeiture statutes to combat numerous different
types of criminal activity,39 including money laundering,4" drug
dealing,4' tax evasion," child pornography,43 health care fraud,"
food stamp fraud,45 and illegal immigration.46
Station to Launder Cash, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Feb. 20, 1996, at BI (discussing
jury verdict that ordered forfeiture of $5 million in drug proceeds by two
defendants who were found guilty of drug-trafficking and money laundering);
Cooperative Legal Effort by L.A. Law Firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcherand
U.S. Attorney's Office Ensures Japanese Victims Will Recover Money in $800
Million Country-Club Fraud, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS,
News Library, BWIRE File (stating that a Japanese company that pleaded
guilty to laundering approximately $256 million in the United States will
forfeit its assets and all the assets of its subsidiary and related companies).
38. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974).
Forfeiture prevents criminals from profiting from crime, and it prevents
property from being used for further illegal purposes. Id.
39. Id. at 683.
40. Bar Owner Admits Role in Big Black Market Operation, TIMES UNION,
Nov. 6, 1998, at B2. The mastermind of a multimillion-dollar smuggling
operation that smuggled $687 million in alcohol and cigarettes into Canada
pleaded guilty to money laundering charges and agreed to forfeit up to $160
million in property. Id. See also Jim Leusner, McCorkles Lose Their
Possessions; The Convicted Couple Must Forfeit Their Homes, Cars and Bank
Accounts, Keeping Only Their Jewelry, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 6, 1998, at
B1 (discussing a jury verdict against an infomercial salesman and his wife,
who were convicted of fraud and money laundering and ordered to forfeit
approximately $10.6 million in assets); Larry Dougherty, Father,Son Guilty of
Conspiracy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 26, 1998, at 4B (stating that two

men who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to launder drug proceeds estimated at
$1.5 million will forfeit two parcels of real property valued at approximately

$121,000).
41. Brendan Stephens, $6 Million Forfeiture Ordered in Drug Trafficking
Conspiracy, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 17, 1998, at 3. Five defendants were
ordered to forfeit $6 million for engaging in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine
and heroin on the west side of Chicago. Id.
42. Jon Steinman, Couple Plead Guilty to Smuggling, Tax Evasion; Court:
Glendale Pair,Accused of Bringing Illegal Chinese Medicines into the United
States, Agree to Forfeit About $6.5 Million in Property and Cash, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 1997, at B6. A husband and wife agreed to forfeit $6.5 million in
assets after pleading guilty to failure to report $4.8 million in income, and
evasion of $1.3 million in taxes. Id.
43. Dan Herbeck, Government Trying to Seize House in Child Porn Case,
BUFF. NEWS, Sept. 5, 1998, at 1C. Forfeiture proceedings were initiated
against a house where videotapes of child pornography were made and where
one of its residents engaged in a sexual act with a minor. Id.
44. Carri Geer, Woman Pleads Guilty to Health Care Fraud, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., Feb. 20, 1998, at lB. A former insurance claims manager who
defrauded state and county health care programs forfeited over $600,000 in
currency and assets. Id.
45. Food Stamp Fraud, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 16, 1998, at A-5.
A defendant's house and property were forfeited as part of punishment for
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The government has stated that the goals of asset forfeiture
are threefold.47 Through the use of forfeiture, the government
strives to: 1) deter and punish criminal activity by depriving
criminals of the fruits of their crime; 2) strengthen cooperation
between international, federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies by means of asset sharing; and 3) enhance law
enforcement by channeling the proceeds from forfeited assets back
into law enforcement programs. ' Additionally, forfeiture is used
to provide restitution to victims. 49
Asset forfeiture has been enormously successful as a tool for
deterrence and punishment. 50 Individuals manufacturing illegal
drugs may reconsider using their real property as a drug factory
knowing that the government can, and mostly likely will, initiate
forfeiture proceedings against the property if the drug
manufacturer is caught. Similarly, individuals using their vehicle
to engage in illegal activity may face forfeiture of the vehicle if the
government can prove that it facilitated the offense. The next
section describes the two methods the government uses to effect
judicial forfeitures. 5'

illegal food stamp trafficking. Id.
46. Gary E. Endelman, PowerPractice;Aliens-And Counsel-Beware,TEX.

LAW., Nov. 18, 1996, at 32. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act permits the forfeiture of assets owned by individuals who
violate immigration laws. Id.
47. Raymond W. Kelly, Introduction to DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
FORFEITURE FUND ANN. REP. (1996).
48. Id. at 1-19; GURULe,, supra note 35, at 26. See generally Gloria Padilla
& Jacque Crouse, Seized Property Aids Police Coffers; DA Says Practice Will
Continue Despite Ethical Objections Raised by Some, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, Aug. 16, 1998, at 2B (discussing millions of dollars in cash and property
that has been seized and forfeited and turned over to law enforcement
agencies to support their enforcement activities). According to United States
Attorney Bill Blagg, forfeiture statutes allow the government to remove
profitability from crime. Id.
49. United States v. BCCI Holdings, 833 F. Supp. 32, 34-35 (D.C. Cir.
1993). Pursuant to a plea agreement, 50% of the forfeited funds were placed
into a compensation fund for victims and creditors, and the other half of the
money was allocated to be used to reimburse banking agencies' insurance
funds for any losses incurred as a result of BCCI's illegal activity. Id. See
generally Hearing on CriminalAsset Forfeiture,supra note 26 (presenting the
statement of Stefan Cassella, Assistant Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money
Laundering Section, Justice Department). The Asset Forfeiture Fund does not
retain any proceeds from forfeited property if there are victims who incurred
financial loss relating to the criminal activity. Id. See generally Cooperative
Legal Effort by L.A. Law Firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcherand U.S. Attorney's
Office Ensures Japanese Victims Will Recover Money in $800 Million CountryClub Fraud, supra note 37 (stating that 90% of the bilked assets that were
recovered will be returned to Japanese victims of fraud).
50. See infra note 63 (providing revenue statistics for asset forfeiture).
51. The scope of this Comment does not include administrative forfeitures,
which are permitted by federal civil forfeiture statutes. Under these statutes,
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B. In Rem v. In PersonamForfeitures
Forfeiture proceedings are either in personam or in rem. In
personam forfeitures require a criminal conviction prior to the
forfeiture of assets. In in rem forfeitures, however, the property
that is being forfeited is deemed to be the guilty party.
The
property itself is the offender,5
and although a criminal
proceeding against the owner of the property may accompany an
in rem proceeding, each proceeding has been held to be
independent of one another.'
The government initiates a civil forfeiture by filing a
Department of Justice and Department of Treasury administrative agencies
are authorized to forfeit assets valued under $500,000 through extra judicial
administrative proceedings. GURULt, supra note 35, at 209-28.

52. United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 233 (1844). In Brig
Malek Adhel, the Court noted that in an in rem forfeiture, the property is what
is deemed to have committed the offense. Id. No regard is given to the actions
of the owner. Id. The Court ruled similarly in United States v. Stowell, 133
U.S. 1, 23 (1889). In upholding the forfeiture of a distillery, where illegal stills
had been placed on the owner's property without his knowledge, the Court
said that the owner's lack of knowledge or participation in the illegal activity
was irrelevant. Id. See also Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395,
399 (1877) (ordering forfeiture of a distillery). In Dobbin's Distillery, the Court
said that a distillery could be forfeited even though the owner had no
knowledge of the illegal activity. Id. The Court said that if a property owner
allows a still to be placed on his land, and the still turns out to be illegal, the
owner is in the same position as if he were the individual engaged in the
illegal activity, and his property may be forfeited. Id. See also The Palmyra,
25 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1827) (upholding forfeiture of a pirate ship). The Court
stated that in rem forfeitures create the fiction that the "thing" is a guilty
party, and that there is no need for an accompanying in personam forfeiture.
Id. at 24-25.
53. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 24-25. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602, 615 (1993) (stating that
[florfeiture has been justified on two theories-that the property itself is
'guilty' of the offense, and that the owner may be held accountable for
the wrongs of others to whom he entrusts his property. Both theories
rest, at bottom, on the notion that the owner has been negligent in
allowing his property to be misused and that he is properly punished for
that negligence).
See also Goldsmith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 508 (1921) (affirming
forfeiture of vehicle used to transport illegal spirits); Dobbin's Distillery, 96
U.S. at 404 (upholding forfeiture of a distillery); Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. at
234 (ordering forfeiture of a ship guilty of piracy).
54. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684 (1974)
(citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 25). In rem forfeitures are neither dependent
on nor affected by in personam proceedings; the two proceedings are entirely
separate. Id. See Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. at 233 (explaining that
[t]he vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as
the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without
any references whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner ....
[Tihis is done from the necessity of the case, as the only adequate means
of suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the
injured party).
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complaint and issuing a warrant of arrest in rem against the
property itself.55 A significant advantage of civil forfeiture, and a
source of criticism against it, is that it permits courts to impose a
penalty or fine without obtaining in personam jurisdiction over the
owner of the property."6 Thus, civil forfeiture is an effective tool for
a court to use when the owner of the asset cannot be criminally
prosecuted, as is the case when there is insufficient evidence of an
underlying violation, or when the property owner has titled the
property in the name of a nominee-owner.57
Although civil forfeiture has been used for almost 200 years,
criminal forfeiture is a more recent development.' While an in
rem forfeiture is a proceeding against the property itself,59 an in
personam forfeiture is a proceeding against the individual and
requires a criminal conviction prior to the forfeiture of any assets.'
The government initiates a criminal forfeiture by filing an
indictment that includes forfeiture allegations against the
individual."' Congress authorized in personam forfeitures when it
enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) in 1970, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention
Act of 1970, the Crime Control Act of 1984, the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986, and other statutes in more recent years that authorize
civil and criminal forfeiture for child pornography, obscenity, and
55. GURULt, supra note 35, at 61.
56. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684 (citing Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. at
233). In Brig Malek Adhel, the Court found that treating a pirate ship as the
guilty party was the only way to achieve a remedy where the ship was used for
piracy without the owner's consent. Id. at 233-34.
57. See also Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 87
(1992). In in rem forfeitures, the legal fiction that the property is the guilty
party was developed to allow the court to achieve a remedy in situations where
it otherwise could not. Id. See generally Hearingon H.R. 1916, supra note 34,
at 216-17 (statement of Stefan Cassella, Assistant Chief, Asset Forfeiture and
Money Laundering Section, Department of Justice) (stating that civil
forfeiture is a highly effective tool to reach the assets of individuals who would
otherwise escape justice). Assets can be forfeited merely on the grounds that
the owner of the property had knowledge of the criminal activity and
consented to it. Id. at 217. The government used this tool to confiscate a
ranch in Montana that was owned by a member of the Columbian drug cartel,
and has also used it to confiscate airplanes, boats, and apartment buildings
that have been used for criminal activity with the owner's consent. Id. at 21617. Civil forfeiture statutes are an effective means of dealing with fugitives
and other criminals who elude prosecution because civil forfeiture does not
require a conviction, as criminal forfeitures do, and it permits the forfeiture of
property owned by individuals other than the defendant. Id.

58. See generally Hearing on Criminal Asset Forfeiture, supra note 26
(statement of Rep. Bill McCullum) (discussing criminal forfeiture statutes that
Congress had enacted since 1970).
59. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (defining in rem
forfeitures).
60. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1827).
61. GURULt, supra note 35, at 59.
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fraud affecting financial institutions.2
Although asset forfeiture has been tremendously successful,'

62. Hearingon CriminalAsset Forfeiture,supra note 26 (statement of Hon.
Bill McCollum, committee chairperson). See generally GURUL9, supra note 35,
at 401-15 (providing text of selected criminal forfeiture statutes).
63. Hearing on H.R. 1916, supra note 34, at 217 (statement of Stefan
Cassella, Deputy Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice). From 1991 to 1996, an average of
nearly half a billion dollars a year has been deposited into the Department of
Justice's Asset Forfeiture Fund, which holds the proceeds of forfeitures. Id.
Deposits for Fiscal Year 1992 through Fiscal Year 1996 are as follows:
FY1992

FY1993

FY1994

FY1995

$531,000,000

$555,700,000

$549,900,000

$487,500,000

FY1996
(projected)
$325,000,000

Id.
Half of the forfeited funds are shared with state and local law
enforcement agencies:
FY1992

FY1993

FY1994

FY1995

$246,600,000

$224,500,000

$228,900,000

$228,700,000

FY1996
(projected)
$175,000,000

Id. at 218.
Forfeiture not only removes profit from crime, but also provides support
to law enforcement agencies who assist in "catching the criminal and bringing
them to justice." Id. See generally DEPIT OF TREASURY FORFEITURE FuND
ANN. REP. (1996) (analyzing the goals and accomplishments of the
Department of Treasury's forfeiture program and providing the financial
statements for the Asset Forfeiture Fund). Forfeiture Fund receipts for fiscal
year 1994 through 1996 are as follows:
FY1994
$184,300,000

FY1995
$271,700,000

FY1996
$190,200,000

Id. at 5.
The Department of Treasury also authorizes equitable sharing
payments to state and local law enforcement agencies and other federal
agencies that participate in joint investigations that result in the seizure of
assets for federal forfeiture. Id. at 10.
Customs Service
$46,124,000

Equitable Sharing by Bureau-FY 1996
Internal Revenue Service I U.S. Secret Service
$13,258,000
$259,000

ATF
$246,000

Id.
See generally U.S. Plans to Build Cells with Criminals' Money, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 1, 1989, at llD (stating "[it is now possible for a
drug dealer to serve time in a forfeiture-financed prison after being arrested
by agents driving a forfeiture-provided automobile while working in a
forfeiture-funded sting operation"); CooperativeLegal Effort by L.A. Law Firm
of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and U.S. Attorney's Office Ensures Japanese
Victims Will Recover Money in $800 Million Country-Club Fraud,supra note
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criticism and allegations of abuse by allegedly overzealous law
enforcement officers and prosecutors have overshadowed this
success." While opponents of forfeiture contend that forfeitures
are often disproportional to the conduct of the offender,65
proponents of the program argue that Congress has intentionally
enacted strict forfeiture statutes to deal with what it considers to
be serious crimes.'
As the impact and the effectiveness of
37 (stating that a Japanese company that pleaded guilty to laundering
approximately $256 million in the United States will reimburse the United
States government for the $2.1 million in investigative expenses that it
incurred).
64. See generally REP. HENRY J. HYDE, CATO INSTITUTE,
PROPERTY

RIGHTS:

IS YOUR

PROPERTY

SAFE

FROM

FORFEITING OUR

SEIZURE?

(1995)

(commenting on the abuses that have resulted from indiscriminate application
of forfeiture statutes and the need for substantial reform of forfeiture laws).
"Foremost among the invasions we now witness are unrelenting government
assaults on property rights, fueled by a dangerous and emotional vigilante
mentality that sanctions shredding the U.S. Constitution into meaningless
confetti." Id. at 1. See generally Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for
Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35

(1998) (stating in part that forfeiture laws have led to improper motives by law
enforcement agencies); see generally Mary M. Cheh, ConstitutionalLimits On
Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law Objectives, 42 HASTINGS L.J.

1325 (1991) (discussing the constitutional implications of combining criminal
and civil remedies); Naftali Bendavid, Second Thoughts on Forfeiture, TEX.

LAW., July 26, 1993, at 18 (discussing U.S. Rep. Henry Hyde's efforts to reform
civil asset forfeiture laws); Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Tainted Cash or Easy
Money? Volusia Deputies Have Seized $8 Million From 1-95 Motorists. The
Trap is For Drug Dealers, But Money is the Object. Three of Every Four
Drivers Were Never Charged, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., June 14, 1992, at Al

(exposing objectionable practices used by state law enforcement officers to
seize currency from motorists traveling on interstate); Dennis Cauchon, Are
Seizures Legalized Theft? Government Doesn't Have To Prove Guilt, USA

May 18, 1992, at 1A (noting that forfeiture laws allow police to take
property from individuals who have neither been convicted of nor charged with
TODAY,

a crime). See also David Heilbroner, The Law Goes On A TreasureHunt, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, § 6, at 70 (suggesting that improper motives have
turned law enforcement officers into financial opportunists); Craig Quintana,
Confiscated Cash Bankrolls FightAgainst Drugs; CriticsSay The Seizure Law
Encourages Police Agencies To Spend Time Looking For Drug Money Instead
Of Fighting Crime, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., June 16, 1992, at Al

(commenting on the motives of law enforcement agencies who benefit
financially from the assets that they seize and forfeit).
65. HYDE, supra note 64, at 7. Rep. Hyde states that penalties are often
not proportional to the gravity of the offense. Id. He provides examples of
forfeiture statutes that he feels are unreasonably applied, such as the seizure
of apartment buildings and hotels where tenants and guests, respectively,
have used the property as a location for drug sales; the seizure of three
fraternity houses at the University of Virginia where drug sales occurred; and
the seizure of a research vessel owned by Scripps Oceanographic Institute
after a marijuana cigarette was found in the locker of a former crew member.
Id.

66. Brief for the United States at *30, United States v. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d
334 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-50094). The government noted that the penalty for
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forfeiture have grown, courts have become increasingly involved in
issues relating to proportionality. Section C provides an overview
of the Supreme Court's recent activity relating to proportionality
and the Excessive Fines Clause.
C. The ConstitutionalProtectionof the Excessive Fines Clause
With an increase in both the volume of forfeiture cases and
the number of forfeiture statutes that Congress has enacted, the
U.S. Supreme Court has used closer scrutiny to determine
whether constitutional rights are being adequately protected.
Prior to Austin v. United States, 9 courts deemed in rem forfeitures
as purely remedial and therefore not subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause. In rem forfeitures were viewed as a means to
reimburse the government for its investigative expenses" 7and
to
1
remove facilitating property and proceeds from "circulation."
In Austin and its companion case, Alexander v. United

violating currency report requirements was "perfectly calibrated" to the
offense, since the amount to be forfeited would match the amount of currency
that was illegally concealed. Id. The government also stated that when
Congress enacts a stiff penalty, it demonstrates the seriousness with which it
views the particular crime. Id. Inherent in the maximum penalty that
Congress has enacted is an indication of the seriousness with which it views
the offense. Id. (citing Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541
(1989)).
67. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 554, 558-59 (1993)
(holding that criminal forfeitures are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993)
(concluding that a forfeiture that is not solely remedial is subject to an
excessiveness inquiry under the Eighth Amendment); United States v. 6625
Zumirez Dr., 845 F. Supp. 725, 735 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (stating that "[flailure to
strictly enforce the Excessive Fines Clause inevitably gives the government an
incentive to investigate criminal activity in situations involving valuable
property, regardless of its seriousness, but to ignore more serious criminal
activity that does not provide financial gain for the government").
68. See, e.g., United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 123-29
(1993) (providing that an innocent owner's property interest supersedes the
relation back doctrine); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290-92 (1996)
(determining that where a fine is not solely punitive, there is no double
jeopardy violation); Alexander, 509 U.S. at 544 (holding that criminal
forfeitures are subject to an excessiveness inquiry under the Eighth
Amendment); Austin, 509 U.S. at 602 (holding that forfeitures of real property
and facilitating conveyances are punitive and require analysis under the
Excessive Fines Clause); United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (1998)
(holding that the standard for excessiveness is grossly disproportional).
69. Austin, 509 U.S. at 602.
70. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972).
The Court stated that forfeiting of goods involved in customs violations is "a
reasonable form of liquidated damages ... that serves to reimburse the
government for investigation and enforcement expenses." Id.
71. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364
(1984).
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2
States,"
the Court held that civil forfeitures were not exclusively
remedial and could be found to be punitive. The Court further
stated that a determination whether the Excessive Fines Clause
applies to a forfeiture hinges on whether the forfeiture is punitive,
not whether the nature of the proceeding is in rem or in
personam.73 Forfeitures may be remedial and punitive, and the
fact that a forfeiture may be only partially punitive does not
remove it from the protection of the Eighth Amendment."' The
Court stated that while some amendments are limited only to
criminal prosecutions, there is nothing in the language of the
Eighth Amendment" to indicate that it should be similarly
restricted.76
Although the Austin Court determined that punitive
forfeitures were subject to an excessiveness inquiry, it declined to
set forth a test to determine whether a forfeiture is excessive."
The result was a conflict in the circuits regarding the proper test
to be applied. 8
The decision in United States v. Bajakajian provided an
answer. In Bajakajian, the Court said the Eighth Amendment
requires an assessment of the gravity of the owner's offense and
the value of the property being forfeited to determine whether the

72. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 576.
73. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610, 621.
74. Id. at 622. See generally Nancy J. King, ProportioningPunishment:
Constitutional Limits On Successive And Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 101, 162 (1995) (discussing civil forfeitures that are partly punitive and
thus subject to constitutional protection). With its decisions in Austin, 509
U.S. 602 (1993), and United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), the Court
notes that there are three levels of civil forfeitures: remedial forfeitures, which
do not trigger any constitutional protections; forfeitures that are partially
punitive, which require double jeopardy and excessiveness protection; and
criminal forfeitures, which entitle a defendant to all of the constitutional
protections that are triggered in a criminal prosecution. King, supra, at 163.
75. Austin, 509 U.S. at 605. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
76. Austin, 509 U.S. at 608.
77. Id. at 622. See infra note 128 (noting the Court's decision to allow the
standard for an excessiveness inquiry to be determined by the lower courts).
78. United States v. 415 E. Mitchell Ave., 149 F.3d 472, 477-78 (6th Cir.
1998) (following the hybrid test); United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 84748 (2d Cir. 1995) (following a hybrid approach); United States v. 6380 Little
Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying hybrid test); United
States v. Bieri, 68 F.3d 232, 236-38 (8th Cir. 1995) (following the hybrid
approach); United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir.
1996) (adopting a proportionality approach); United States v. Wild, 47 F.3d
669, 676 (4th Cir. 1995) (utilizing a proportionality test); United States v.
Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994) (adopting an instrumentality
approach). See Stacy J. Pollock, Proportionalityin Civil Forfeiture:Toward a
Remedial Solution, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 456, 475-78 (1994) (noting that
there is no national standard for excessiveness inquiries in civil forfeitures).
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fine is grossly disproportional."9 In solving one problem, the Court
has seemingly created others. Although the Court indicated that
the standard is "grossly disproportional," it provided little
guidance regarding what constitutes a proportional forfeiture. As
one Department of Justice official commented, the Court has left
"it up to every judge in the country to decide what's grossly
disproportional.""
Additionally, the impact Bajakajian will have on the
forfeiture of proceeds, conveyances, and instrumentalities is
unclear.
These items are frequently forfeited in in rem
proceedings.8' In Austin, the Court held that a forfeiture that is
even partly punitive will fall within the protections of the Eighth
Amendment, regardless of whether it is designated in rem or in
82
personam.
However, in Bajakajian,the Court defined certain in
rem customs forfeitures as non-punitive.'
Consequently, the
Court's decision in Bajakajian casts doubt about whether the
Excessive Fines Clause applies to in rem forfeitures that have
been traditionally considered remedial.
II. PROPORTIONALITY AND THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE
Section A analyzes the history, purpose and development of
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Next,
Section B provides an overview of the tests used by the circuits
(prior to the Court's decision in Bajakajian)to determine whether
a fine was excessive.
A. The Excessive Fines Clause
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.'
When drafted, the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment received little attention.*
In general, the First
Congress hardly discussed the Excessive Fines Clause and the
Eighth Amendment.' Consequently, courts have had to determine
79. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2036.
80. Zremski, supra note 1, at 1B (quoting Stefan Cassella, Assistant Chief
of the Department of Justice's Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering
Section).

81. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1998). This statute authorizes the civil forfeiture of
real and personal property that is involved in an offense such as money
laundering or structuring, or a violation of currency reporting requirements.
Id. Title 21 U.S.C. § 881 authorizes the civil forfeiture of real and personal
property that is involved in drug offenses. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1998).

82. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993).
83. See 415 E. Mitchell Ave., 149 F.3d at 477 n.3 (discussing Bajakajian).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
85. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2037.
86. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264
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the meaning and scope of the Excessive Fines Clause
independently.
Apparently, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution drafted the
Excessive Fines Clause to prevent the government from exacting
excessive punishment in criminal prosecutions." One reason the
clause did not receive debate at the time of its drafting may have
been that several states already had similar language in their
constitutions.' The colonies were eager to prevent the abuses that
had occurred in England before the reign of William and Mary. 89
Prior to the adoption of the English Bill of Rights of 1689,
which is the precursor to the Excessive Fines Clause, English
judges often assessed heavy fines against enemies of the King."
They intended to subject individuals unable to pay their fines to
periods of lengthy imprisonment.9 These abuses prompted the
legislature to enact the English Bill of Rights of 1689,9" which
protected individuals from excessive fines. 93 The drafters of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights and the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution' adopted the language of the English Bill of Rights.
The Court has interpreted the Excessive Fines Clause to
mean that the government cannot abuse its power by imposing
excessive fines as punishment.95 It is fundamental law that a
punishment must be proportional to the gravity of the offense.' 6 In
Weems v. United States, the Court re-affirmed the power of the
legislature to define offenses and establish corresponding

(1989); Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2037.
87. Browning-FerrisIndus., 492 U.S. at 262-65.
88. Id. at 264.
89. Id. at 267.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 376 (1910). In its discussion of
the Eighth Amendment, the Court notes that one of the earliest uses of the
Excessive Fines Clause was in 1689 when an English lord was fined 30,000
pounds for assaulting a fellow lord. Id. In striking down the fine as excessive,
the court of King's Bench said that the fine was "excessive and exorbitant,
against Magna Charta, the common right of the subject and the law of the
land." Id.
93. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1983).
94. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266

(1989). The Framers of the Constitution adopted the Eight Amendment to
restrict the prosecutorial powers of the government. Id.
95. Id. at 267. "The [E]ighth [A]mendment is addressed to courts of the
United States exercising criminal jurisdiction." Id. at 262-63 (citing Ex parte
Watkins, 7 Pet. 568, 573-74 (1833)). A fine has been defined as a "payment to
the sovereign as punishment for some offense." Browning-FerrisIndus., 492

U.S. at 265 (citing 1 E. Coke, Institutes). "A fine signifieth a percuniarie
punishment for an offence, or a contempt committed against the king." Id.
96. Solem, 463 U.S. at 286-87. "[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment

for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense." Id. at 287.
(citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 367).
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punishments, but stated that it is the duty of the Court to
intervene if a legislative act is contrary to the Constitution.97 The
Court must consider the perspective and the goals of the
legislature when it enacted the punishment to determine whether
the government has appropriately used its power.9 8
In seeking to determine the boundaries of the Excessive Fines
Clause, the Court found interpretations of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause useful." In Ingraham v. Wright, the Court
stated that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
establishes limits for the types of punishments that can be enacted
and imposed."° The Ingraham Court also said that punishments
not criminal in nature may be subject to an Eighth Amendment
analysis if they are sufficiently similar to criminal punishment. 1 '
For almost 100 years, the Court has used the proportionality
concept as the constitutional standard for satisfying an Eighth
Amendment inquiry. 0 2 The Court has continued to hold that the
Eighth Amendment forbids punishments grossly disproportional to
the gravity of the offense.'
In Solem v. Helm, which involved an
application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the
Court stated that several factors should be considered when
determining whether a particular punishment satisfies the
requirements of the Eighth Amendment." First, the severity of
the offense must be considered in relation to the harshness of the
punishment'" Second, the court should consider the types of
punishments it imposes for other offenses in the same jurisdiction,
as well as punishments other courts impose for similar offenses in
other jurisdictions. ' 6
Third, the court may compare the
seriousness of the crime,
the threatened or actual harm, and the
10 7
motive of the offender.
While some circuits used the Solem test to determine the
M

97. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378-79.
98. Id. at 379.
99. Browning-FerrisIndus., 492 U.S. at 263 n.3.
100. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977).
101. Id. at 669 n.37. See generally Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,
608 n.4 (1993) (discussing the application of various constitutional protections
to criminal and civil forfeiture proceedings). "[Elven those protections
associated with criminal cases may apply to a civil forfeiture proceeding if it is

so punitive that the proceeding must reasonably be considered criminal." Id.
(citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)).
102. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983). The Eighth Amendment "is
directed... against all punishments which by their excessive length or

severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." Id. at 287 n.11
(citing O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)).
103. Id. at 288.
104. Id. at 290-93.
105. Id. at 290-91.
106. Id. at 291.
107. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-94.
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°
proportionality of civil forfeitures,'O
other circuits have held that
an Eighth Amendment analysis is inappropriate'" because the
decision in Ingraham did not address the question whether the
Eighth Amendment applied solely to criminal matters. 10
Prior to the Court's decision in Austin, it had considered the
Excessive Fines Clause only once before, in Browning-Ferris
Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc."' However, with
its decisions in Austin v. United States and United States v.
Alexander, the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause applied
to both civil..2 and criminal forfeitures.'
In Austin, the Court held
that nothing in the language or the history of the Eighth
Amendment restricted its application to criminal matters."" The
Court stated that the nature of the forfeiture will determine
whether an Excessive Fines Clause inquiry is necessary."'
The Austin Court disagreed with the government's argument
that an in rem forfeiture of a mobile home and auto body shop
used by defendant Austin to store and sell cocaine was remedial
rather than punitive."' After Austin pleaded guilty to possession
of cocaine with intent to distribute, the government sought to seize
his properties on the grounds that they were instrumentalities of
the crime, and their forfeiture would reimburse the government
for its investigative expenses." 7 The Court found that the
forfeiture of the property could not be considered "solely"
remedial."'
After reviewing several factors, including
congressional intent that the statute punish culpable owners, the

108. GURULt, supra note 35, at 283.
109. Id. For a list of cases in which the lower courts that held that the
protections of the Eighth Amendment apply only to criminal forfeitures, see
id. at n.111.
110. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263
(1989). The Court "left open in Ingraham the possibility that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause might find application in some civil cases." Id.
"Some punishments, though not labeled 'criminal' by the State, may be
sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments in the circumstances in which
they are administered to justify application of the Eighth Amendment."
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 n.37 (1977). "[W]e need not go so far as
to hold that the Excessive Fines Clause applies just to criminal cases."
Browning-FerrisIndus., 492 U.S. at 263.
111. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 606 (1993); GURULP, supra note
35, at 265 n.3.
112. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
113. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1993).
114. Austin, 509 U.S. at 608.
115. Id. at 610. "[Tlhe question is whether forfeiture serves in part to
punish, and one need not exclude the possibility that forfeiture serves other
purposes to reach that conclusion." Id. at 618 n.12 (citing United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989)).
116. Id. at 620-21.
117. Id. at 604-06.
118. Id. at 622.
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Court concluded that the forfeiture was at least partially
punitive.19
Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether the forfeiture
was excessive."n The Court indicated that the lower courts should
establish their own analysis for evaluating excessiveness claims.'
In Austin's companion case, United States v. Alexander, the
Court held that an in personam forfeiture required an assessment
under the Eighth Amendment to determine whether a penalty was
excessive.'n After the government convicted defendant Alexander
of seventeen obscenity charges and three counts of violating the
RICO Act, he was sentenced to six years in prison and assessed a
$100,000 fine. 2 3 In addition, the District Court for the District of
Minnesota ordered Alexander to forfeit his interest in real estate
and businesses valued at $9 million, which represented his share
of property that was either associated with or derived from the
racketeering offenses. 2
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision, holding that an Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis was not required if a defendant's sentence
12
was less than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court distinguished the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, stating it was irrelevant to
determining whether a fine was excessive, from the Excessive
Fines Clause, which it said applied to any fine assessed by the
government as punishment. 26 As in Austin, the Court remanded
the judgment to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the
fine was excessive. 7
Although the Court stated that in personam and punitive in
rem forfeitures were subject to an excessiveness inquiry, it
declined to provide the lower courts with a standard for
determining what constitutes an excessive fine under the Eighth

119. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621-22.
In light of the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment, the
clear focus of § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) on the culpability of the owner, and
the evidence that Congress understood those provisions as serving to
deter and to punish, we cannot conclude that forfeiture under 881(a)(4)
and (a)(7) serves solely a remedial purpose.
Id.
120. Id. at 622-23.
121. Id. "Prudence dictates that we allow the lower courts to consider that
question in the first instance." Id.
122. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 559 (1993).
123. Id. at 547-48.
124. Id. at 548.
125. Id. at 558.
126. Id. "[Tihe Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's power to
extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some
offense." See id. (citingAustin, 509 U.S. at 609-10).
127. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 559.
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Amendment. ' The result was a split among the circuits with
different tests to determine what constitutes excessiveness.12
B. Tests used by the Circuit Courts for Excessiveness Inquiries
The circuit courts developed three different approaches for
evaluating
fines under the Eighth Amendment: the
instrumentality test, the proportionality test, and the hybrid (or
multi-factor) test.13 °
Although courts no longer apply the
instrumentality test, certain aspects of it are relevant to the
hybrid test. Therefore, a discussion of the instrumentality test is
included to better understand the current analysis that courts
apply.
Justice Scalia advocated the instrumentality test"3 ' in his
concurring opinion in Austin."'3 Because the fines assessed in in
rem forfeitures generally correlate with the value of the property
that has been unlawfully used rather than the severity of the
offense or the value of the forfeited property, an in rem forfeiture
opposes the requirements of the Eighth Amendment, unless the
property sufficiently relates to the offense."'3 The proper test,
according to Justice Scalia, requires an inquiry into whether the
relationship was "close enough to render the property, under
traditional standards, 'guilty' and hence forfeitable.' 8,
The
majority declined to establish a test to determine what constitutes
"excessiveness" and noted that the courts were free to include any

128. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622-23 (stating that it is best

to let the lower courts establish the test for excessiveness); Alexander, 509
U.S. at 559 (stating that it prefers that the lower court determine its own test
for excessiveness).
129. Pollock, supra note 78, at 475-78 (noting that there is no national
standard for excessiveness inquiries in civil forfeitures). The decision in
Austin appears to authorize the district courts to fashion their own tests based
on either the factors set out in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), or the
relationship between the asset and the offense. Id. at 475. The contrast
between these two approaches makes it unlikely that the courts will arrive at
a uniform standard for determining whether a civil forfeiture is excessive. Id.
130. GURUL9, supra note 35, at 273-79. See United States v. Chandler, 36

F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 1994) (adopting an instrumentality approach); United
States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir. 1996) (adopting the
pure proportionality approach). See generally Sarah N. Welling & Medrith
Lee Hager, Defining Excessiveness: Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil

Forfeiture After Austin v. United States, 83 KY. L.J. 835, 850-79 (1995)
(providing a comprehensive overview and analysis of the tests that are used by

different circuits).
131. GURULt, supra note 35, at 273.
132. Austin, 509 U.S. at 627-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 627. "Scales used to measure out unlawful drug sales, for
example, are confiscable whether made of the purest gold or the basest metal."

Id.
134. Id. at 628.
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other factors in their analysis deemed relevant.' 3' Though the
Fourth Circuit adopted a pure instrumentality approach in
deciding when an in rem forfeiture is excessive,lm other circuits
developed tests that looked beyond the relationship of the property
to the offense.
In United States v. 427 and 429 Hall Street, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals applied a pure proportionality test,"' as
defined in Solem v. Helm." The court upheld an in rem forfeiture
of real property owned by an individual who pleaded guilty to
unlawful possession of cocaine in Alabama state court. 39 In
determining that the forfeiture of the defendant's house was not
excessive, the court considered the value of the property, the
seriousness of the offense, and the potential punishment for the
offense under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 4 ' After
finding that the defendant could have been fined $40,000 and
imprisoned for twenty-one months, the Eleventh Circuit upheld
the civil forfeiture of his house, which was valued at $65,000.'14
The court declined to establish a list of factors to consider, noting

135. Id. at 623 n.15. While the relationship between the property and the
offense may be helpful in a proportionality determination, the decision should
not be interpreted to mean that it limits the factors that can be considered, or
that other factors are not relevant. Id.
136. GURUL8, supra note 35, at 274. See United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d
358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994) (adopting an instrumentality approach rather than
the proportionality test set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)). The
Fourth Circuit stated that Congress intended that civil forfeitures for drug
violations be correlated to the value of the property that was involved in the
offense, rather than to a set fine. Id. at 364. Accordingly, it applied a threepart instrumentality test that considered the connection between the property
and the offense, the role of the owner in the offense, and the ease with which
the offending property can be severed from the rest of the property. Id. at 365.
In summing up its determination that an instrumentality test should be used,
the court said that the Eighth Amendment requires that "the court must be
able to conclude, under the totality of the circumstances, that the property was
a substantial and meaningful instrumentality in the commission of the
offense, or would have been had the offensive conduct been carried out as

intended." Id.
137. GURULP, supra note 35, at 276. See United States v. 427 & 429 Hall
St., 74 F.3d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir. 1996) (concluding that an excessiveness
inquiry requires a proportionality test). The court based its decision on the
history and meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, and the rationale of the
U.S. Supreme Court in the Austin decision. Id. "The proportionality test
compares the nature of the offense with the harshness, monetary or otherwise,
of the forfeiture imposed on the owner." United States v. 6380 Little Canyon
Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 982 (1995).
138. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291-93 (1983). See supra notes 104-107
and accompanying text (describing the factors that the Court considered in
Solem).

139. 427& 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d at 1173.
140. Id. at 1172.
141. Id. at 1172-73.
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that such factors would differ with each case. 142
Many other circuits have adopted the hybrid, or multi-factor
test,'
which combines aspects of the instrumentality and
proportionality approaches.'" In United States v. Bieri, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the forfeiture of a farm that the
defendants used in a conspiracy to distribute marijuana.'" After
noting "the Eighth Amendment demands that a constitutionally
cognizable disproportionality reach such a level of excessiveness
that in justice the punishment is more criminal than the crime,"'"
the court considered several factors in determining that the
forfeiture was not grossly disproportional. The Eighth Circuit
considered the "extent and duration" of the criminal activity, the
penalties that could have been assessed against Mr. and Mrs.
Bieri for their offenses, and the severity of the offense in relation
to the value of the property.' 7
In United States v.Milbrand, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals also used a combination of the instrumentality and
proportionality approaches to subject a farm, again used to grow
large quantities of marijuana, to forfeiture.' 8 The court considered
several factors, including the severity of the forfeiture, the nexus
between the property and the offense, and the extent of the
owner's participation in the offense.'49
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals established a slightly
different hybrid test. In United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Road,
the court established a two-prong test."0
First, the court
determined whether the property was an instrumentality of the
offense. Second, the court determined whether the forfeiture was

142. Id. at 1172 (citing United States v. Monroe, 866 F.2d 1357, 1366 (11th

Cir. 1989)). "The Eighth Amendment prohibits only those forfeitures that, in
light of all relevant circumstances, are grossly disproportionate to the offense
committed." Id. (quoting United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
143. GURULt, supra note 35, at 276-79. See United States v. Milbrand, 58
F.3d 841, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1995) (adopting hybrid approach); United States v.
Bieri, 68 F.3d 232, 236 (8th Cir. 1995) (adopting the hybrid approach); United
States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 1995) (adopting a
two-prong hybrid approach).
144. GURULP,, supra note 35, at 273-79; 427 & 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d at 1170;
United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 1994). See generally
Welling & Hager, supra note 130, at 850-79 (1995) (providing a comprehensive
overview and analysis of the tests that are used by different circuits).
145. Bieri, 68 F.3d at 238.
146. Id. at 236 (quoting United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir.
1993)).
147. Id. 236-38.
148. Milbrand,58 F.3d at 847.
149. Id. at 847-48.
150. United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir.
1995). GURULA, supra note 35, at 277.
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proportional to the gravity of the offense.' The court stated that
the district court, in its proportionality analysis, should consider
the harshness of the forfeiture and the role of the owner in the
offense."' Relevant factors include the value of the property, the
hardship that the forfeiture would have on the defendant, whether
the defendant intentionally or negligently allowed the property to
be used in the offense, and the extent of harm that resulted from
the offense."
When the Ninth Circuit applied its two-prong test in United
States v. Bajakajian, it held that the forfeiture of any amount of
the currency would be excessive under an Eighth Amendment
analysis because the undeclared currency was not an
instrumentality of the offense." After granting the government's
petition for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court determined
that the proper standard was the grossly disproportional
standard. 5' In adopting the standard it previously established for
its analysis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in
Solem, the Court stated that the forfeiture amount must be
compared to the severity of the offender's violation."
In other
words, a forfeiture
that is grossly disproportional
is
unconstitutional."7
Although the Court established a standard for determining
when a fine is excessive, the question of what constitutes a
proportional penalty remains unanswered. Consequently, it is
unclear whether the circuits will apply the pure proportionality
test or the hybrid test. Part III of this Comment advocates using
the hybrid test to determine whether a fine is proportional under
the Eighth Amendment.

III. PROPORTIONALITY AS APPLIED TO CRIMINAL
AND CIVIL FORFEITURES

We now hold that a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive
Fines Clause if it is Irossly disproportionalto the gravity of a
defendant's offense.'
Section A proposes that the hybrid test should be applied by
district courts to determine what constitutes a proportional
forfeiture. Section B argues that the holding in Austin is still good
law and applies to in rem forfeitures that are partially punitive in

151. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d at 982; GURULk, supra note 35, at 277.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d at 985-86.
Id.
United States v. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d 334, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2036 (1998).
Id. at 2037-38.
Id. at 2038.
Id.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[33:243

nature.
A. What is Proportionality?
In the aftermath of Bajakajian, it must be determined what
constitutes a proportional fine.
This requires a further
determination of the test that district courts should apply.
Where, for instance, currency has been seized pursuant to a
currency reporting violation, as in Bajakajian, and there is no
evidence of additional illegal activity to render the currency
"tainted," forfeiture of the full amount of currency is clearly
impermissible under the holding in Bajakajian. What remains
unanswered, however, is what percentage of the currency can be
forfeited for a violation that is not considered to be a grave offense.
Although the courts have not yet arrived at a definitive test, they
have set forth several factors that are relevant to the
determination of whether a forfeiture is proportional. Among the
factors to be considered are: 1) the source of the currency (whether
it was legally or illegally acquired); 2) its intended purpose
(whether it was intended for an illicit purpose); 3) the nature of
the offense; 4) the penalties that could be applied under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines; 5) other penalties that have been
enacted by Congress with regard to that particular violation; 6)
the extent of the harm caused by the violation; and 7) the fact that
the violation was unrelated to any other illegal activity. 59
Although these factors have been enumerated in cases involving
currency-reporting violations, they provide a useful guideline for
determining proportionality in instances where the violation
merits a forfeiture of less than the full value of the asset.
In instances where there is evidence of illegal activity in
addition to the violation giving rise to the forfeiture, the most
appropriate test to determine proportionality is the hybrid test
because it best balances the protections of the Excessive Fines
Clause and the goals of law enforcement.
As discussed in Part II of this Comment, the hybrid test
requires the Court to consider numerous factors in determining
whether a fine is proportional. The factors that the Court may
consider are 1) the severity of the forfeiture considered in relation
to the nature of the offense and the value of the property,"'O 2)

159. United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v.
$273,969.04, 164 F.3d 462, 466 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. $57,835, No.
97-6023, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23529, at *6 (2d Cir. Sept. 18, 1998); United
States v. $64,000, No. 97C5363, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3372, at *22 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 10, 1999).
160. United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1995). The court
affirmed the forfeiture of a farm valued at $68,000 after comparing the value
of the farm to the amount of marijuana found on it and the potential penalties
that could be imposed for possession of the crop. Id. at 848.
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whether the property was an instrumentality of the offense,"' and
3) the potential sentence for the violation.'62
This test is most appropriate because it serves the goals of
government, while protecting claimants and defendants with
regard to their property. In addition, it does not arbitrarily
determine whether a forfeiture is excessive. Since circumstances
vary from case to case, the court should consider many factors in
deciding whether a fine is proportional.
The hybrid test is superior to the pure proportionality
approach, which compares the value of the property forfeited with
the gravity of the offense,l 63 because it considers additional highly
relevant factors in an excessiveness inquiry. For example, a
defendant may be accused of growing $20,000 worth of marijuana
on a farm that is valued at $800,000. While the proportionality
approach also considers the nature and extent of the criminal
activity,'
it focuses primarily on the proportionality of the
forfeiture to the offense. This approach provides an incomplete
picture of all factors district courts should consider to justify a
forfeiture. A court should consider whether the farm was critical
to the success of the marijuana-growing operation, and whether
the owner used a majority of the property to grow marijuana.
Equally relevant is whether the landowner realized large profits
from the operation, and whether the sole purpose for purchasing
the property was to grow marijuana. Including these factors
would provide a more complete picture of why a court should not
find forfeiture of the farm an excessive fine under the Eighth
Amendment.
From the perspective of a property owner defending against
the government's efforts to effect a forfeiture, the above factors are
equally important and relevant. Using the same example, suppose
that the farm owner was merely negligent in allowing another
individual to grow marijuana on the farm owner's land and did not
personally benefit from the sale of the marijuana. Balancing these

161. United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir.
1995). The court stated that the first prong of its two-prong approach for
determining excessiveness requires a nexus between the offense and the
property to be forfeited. Id.

162. United States v. Bieri, 68 F.3d 232, 237 (8th Cir. 1995). The court
compared the criminal activity of the defendants to the actual and potential
penalties that could have been imposed upon them. Id.

163. United States v. Wild, 47 F.3d 669, 676 (4th Cir. 1995). The court
stated that the value of the property should be compared against the severity
of the offense. Id. See United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d 1165,
1172-73 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming the forfeiture of property valued at $65,000
after comparing the value of the property against the seriousness of the

offense and the potential sentence that could have been imposed on the
defendant).
164. Wild, 47 F.3d at 676.
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factors allows a court and the government to make a more
informed decision. Just as it is critical in an excessiveness review
to weigh the value of the asset to be forfeited against the
maximum penalty that could be imposed, it is equally important to
consider the relationship between the property and the offense. A
failure to include factors relevant to this relationship would be a
failure to consider facts that can mitigate or strengthen a claim
that a forfeiture is excessive.
The majority opinion in Bajakajian also raises the issue of
whether Justice Clarence Thomas indicated that the holding in
Austin was no longer good law. The next section proposes that
this was not his intention, and that Austin continues to ensure
that an in rem forfeiture of proceeds, instrumentalities or
facilitating property falls within the protection of the Excessive
Fines Clause if the forfeiture is deemed partially punitive.
B. Has BajakajianCompromised the Holding in Austin?
As discussed in Section II of this Comment, Austin v. United
States held that any forfeiture that is punitive in nature is subject
to an excessiveness inquiry under the Eighth Amendment.'"
While purely remedial forfeitures that deprive individuals of
property that facilitated or is derived from criminal activity likely
cannot be considered excessive, the Court said that punitive
forfeitures clearly fall within the protection of the Constitution.'6
However, dicta in Bajakajianweakens this position.
Although Justice Thomas cited Austin when he stated that "a
modern statutory forfeiture is a 'fine' for Eighth Amendment
purposes if it constitutes punishment even in part,"'67 he later
provided contradictory language in one of his footnotes. After
rejecting the government's argument that forfeiture of the entire
amount of currency seized from Bajakajian would be proportional
because the First Congress enacted similar penalties at the time it
ratified the Eighth Amendment, Justice Thomas noted that
comparing the modem and early statutes is not useful to the
proportionality argument."
Justice Thomas stated that the
customs statutes enacted at the time of the First Congress do not
support a conclusion that a full forfeiture of Bajakajian's currency
is proportional because "the type of forfeiture that they [the early
customs statutes] imposed was not considered punishment for a
criminal offense."'"9 He also noted that the Department of Justice
recognized certain types of forfeitures as remedial, such as those

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1993).
Id.
Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2035 n.6 (citingAustin, 509 U.S. at 627-28).
Id. at 2039.
Id. (emphasis added).
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1 70
involving customs, narcotics, and revenue statutes.
This statement appears to conflict with"the Court's holding in
Austin, which states that any type of statute, regardless of
whether it is a customs, narcotics or revenue statute, is protected
by the Eighth Amendment if it is partially punitive.'71 As the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out in a subsequent
decision regarding a narcotics case, it also appears that the
context of the statement was a discussion regarding early customs
statutes, rather than drug statutes. 172
Bajakajian, however,
involved a violation of customs laws. Nonetheless, Justice Thomas
indicated that the forfeiture of Bajakajian's currency was punitive,
and protected by the Excessive Fines Clause. Consequently, it
does not appear that Justice Thomas intended to remove remedial
forfeitures from the ambit of the Eighth Amendment if they are
partially punitive.

CONCLUSION

In United States v.Bajakajian, the U.S Supreme Court stated
that when the Eighth Amendment applies to forfeitures, the
standard for excessiveness is whether the forfeiture is "grossly
disproportional" to the severity of the offense. Where there is no
evidence of additional wrongdoing besides the violation giving rise
to the forfeiture, courts must carefully consider numerous factors
relating to the nature of the offense.
In instances where the government can establish that there
has been additional wrongdoing, the appropriate test to determine
whether a forfeiture is proportional, as opposed to grossly
disproportional, is the hybrid test. By including factors relating to
instrumentality and proportionality, district courts can best
satisfy the requirements of the Eighth Amendment and the goals
of Congress in enacting the forfeiture statutes.

170. Id. at 2039-40 n.16. Justice Thomas included the following excerpt
from a Senate hearing on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 in support
of his statement.
The concept of forfeiture as a criminal penalty which is embodied in this

provision differs from other presently existing forfeiture provisions
under Federal statutes where the proceeding is in rem against the thing
which is declared unlawful under the statute, or which is used for an
unlawful purpose, or in connection with the prohibited property or
transaction, is considered the offender, and the forfeiture is no part of
the punishment for the criminal offense. Examples of such forfeiture
provisions are those contained in the customs, narcotics, and revenue

laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
171. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621-22.
172. United States v. 415 E. Mitchell Ave., 149 F.3d 472, 477 n.3 (6th Cir.
1998).
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Regarding the increased burden on the government to
demonstrate that forfeitures are proportional, the government
should seek to include any additional violations that have a nexus
to the forfeiture proceedings. Evidence of any additional violations
would work towards establishing the proportionality of a forfeiture
and would help to avoid successful challenges to forfeitures on
excessiveness grounds.

